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Abstract: 
Major and less important parameters affecting the efficiency of the Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) in Infrastructure development have been discussed and analyzed 
thoroughly in International research. Issues related to the Residual Value factor are under 
consideration recently, mainly from countries and organizations that have implemented 
PPPs years ago and now they have to manage risks associated with Residual Value. 
Efficiency in Residual Value is close related with the proper quality of the provided services 
by the infrastructure, ensures Value for Money and maximizes the returns on investment. The 
specific risk is more important to the concession projects where the infrastructure returns to 
the beneficial owner after the expiration of the contractual period. The paper examines the 
influence, importance and treatment of the Residual Value parameter in leasehold 
concession agreements, since this type of concessions have been analyzed less that the 
schemes related to Built Operate Transfer (BOT) contracts. Residual value risk and its 
management is an issue that should be taken into consideration from the tendering phase of 
the project during the optimal selection of the preferred bidder. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Residual Value constitutes an important parameter when assessing infrastructure 
projects viability during the investment analysis as well as during the Value for 
Money test for the public sector. In absolute terms Residual Value presents the 
remaining discounted value of the investment at the end of the period which can be 
considered as the liquidation value of the asset (European Commission, 2008). 
 
Section 2 describes the essence of Residual Value in PPP projects general, since the 
life cycle of infrastructures usually exceed the horizon of PPP contracts. The 
importance of Residual Value regardless which calculation method is being applied 
and the necessity of including it into the Value for Money assessment is presented in 
section 3 of the paper. 
 
Sections 4 and 5 focus on the specific PPP type, the leasehold concessions which are 
a significant tool for utilizing existing infrastructures of the state in cooperation with 
the private sector. Due to its importance, Residual Value is an important factor 
during the selection of the optimal bidder and its contribution to the final outcome 
and project’s value should be included in the models which are used in order to 
assess the financial offers of the participants. 
 
2. Residual Value in PPP Projects      
 
Despite the fact that in some papers and research, the issues related to the Residual 
Value of the infrastructures in Public Private Partnerships seems to be a risk of low 
importance and influence3, there is a special attention during the last years on the 
transfer of ownership of infrastructure from the private to the public sector after the 
expiration of the contractual period (Sadka, 2006; Iosa, 2008; Grout, 2005). This 
subject is under more detail consideration especially in countries that have 
implemented PPPs years ago and apparently they have experienced also the 
completion of the contracts and the transfer of the asset to the public sector. 
Governments and public sector authorities which have initiated the schemes of PPPs 
only few years ago they do not have dealt with the Residual Value issues since the 
number of the completed contracts is insignificant.  
 
This problem will appear in a later stage. Most of the projects developed under 
various PPP schemes are infrastructures (stand alone projects or networks) and 
related facilities for the society (such as transportation, energy, water and waste 
treatment etc). The studies, engineering and life cycle exceed 50 years or even more. 
 
3 Xu (2010) presents that Residual Value risk in a number of PPP projects that he analyzes in 
China has less significance for the participants in the study, who are actually professionals 
involved direct or indirect with the specific projects.    
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The period of the agreement between the parties (public and private sector) in most 
of the cases does not exceed 35 or 40 years depending on the project, its nature and 
characteristics (Iosa, 2006). Therefore it is plausible that the issue related to the 
physical and operational condition at the termination of the contract, on which the 
infrastructure will be delivered / transferred back to its initial owner (i.e. public 
sector), should be under consideration (Sadka, 2006). 
 
Residual value in absolute terms represents the value of the infrastructure at the 
project’s lifetime span and it is calculated as the market value of the fixed asset as it 
was sold at the end of the specific period (horizon of the project) providing the 
equivalent liquidity.  
 
3. The Importance of Residual Value Parameter 
 
Residual Value at lower level compared with the one initially calculated can be 
considered as an indirect discount on projects’ quality which leads to services of 
poor quality, lower demand and as a result revenues that diverge from the budget 
and the projections during the initial studies and business plans (ΝΑΟ, 2004). This 
applies both during the operation of the project from the private partner as well as at 
the expiration of the contract agreement. Research has shown that projects under 
BOT schemes lower Residual Value is close related with shorter life cycle and less 
revenue stream.4 More specifically during the expiration of the contractual period 
the asset has a remaining life cycle and the amount of the possible capital needed to 
be invested in order the infrastructure to be at the condition to provide services, is a 
critical factor affecting viability, regardless if the management will be undertaken by 
the private or the public sector. 
 
In some cases in existing concession projects the contractual period T is not fixed 
from the outset but is subject to consideration and negotiation between the parties in 
order to meet specific criteria5. This includes that the NPV of the private sector to be 
higher that the invested capital I included its interest R (I R ≤ NPVp) and at the same 
time the NPV of the public sector for the post transfer period to be greater than zero 
(NPVg ≥ 0) (Shen, 2002). This implies that the residual value of the infrastructure is 
has significant importance for the government.   
 
4 Jang (2010) in his Phd Thesis refers to the direct correlation of the Residual Value, the life 
cycle of the project and the generated revenues from the operation. He uses the technique of 
loop diagrams to justify his opinion and findings.  
5 There is the opinion that the government benefits less or the private entity benefits too 
much from PPP contracts. Generally, a longer concession period is more beneficial to the 
private investor, and it may result in loss to the government. On the other hand, if the 
concession period is too short, the investor will either reject the contract offer or search for 
additional securities or sources that will provide the required level of profit. 
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In traditional cost – benefit analysis for the appraisal of medium and large scale 
infrastructure projects by the public sector the Residual Value might be 
overestimated, diminishing project’s performance and returns (Florio, 2003). The 
applied methods for calculating the Residual Value do not estimate accurate the exit 
value of the infrastructure6. However in PPP projects and especially in concession 
and leasehold concession projects where the public sector has to assess and evaluate 
the offers / bids from the private enterprises the importance and the contribution of 
the Residual Value should be taken into consideration on the models (South Wales 
Government, 2007) and would lead to more complete contracts (Iosa, 2006). 
 
EU guide for cost – benefit analysis proposes some alternatives for taking into 
consideration the residual value such as the standard accounting depreciation 
procedure (which is based on all fixed assets and liabilities) and the residual value 
deriving from the calculation of the NPV in the financial analysis of the cash flows 
for the remaining life span of the infrastructure (European Commission, 2008).  
 
Especially in concession projects of utilizing existing infrastructure, where the 
private sector will commit capital investment to upgrade the facilities, proper 
consideration of Residual’s Value contribution will increase concessions value. 
Moreover and regardless if the public sector is paying a price for the transfer of the 
asset to the government or not, after the expiration of the contractual period, it bears 
a part of the residual value risk of the asset and therefore this should be included in 
financial and accounting analysis (OECD, 2008).          
 
4. The Case in Leasehold Concession Projects 
 
The significance of Residual Value component as a risk in PPPs has leaded the 
relevant governmental authorities in many countries to propose various methods of 
calculation during the process of Value for Money testing7. According to these 
directions the Residual Value is either calculated separately and directly at the 
applied models or, based on its importance as a significant risk, it is taken into 
consideration (after the necessary modifications) in the discount factor as part of the 
systematic risk of the project (Public Private Partnerships, 2007).   
 
Similar to the procedure of testing the Value for Money achievement in BOT 
projects, it is essential to consider the effect of the Residual Value in the case of 
leasehold concession projects and especially during the assessment of the financial 
offers submitted by the participants to the tender. Given the fact that leasehold 
 
6 Methods of calculating Residual Value at cost – benefit analysis approach are presented 
analytically by Jones (2014).    
7 Refer to South Wales Government (2007) and Public Private Partnerships (2007) for the 
cases of Australia and Ireland respectively.  
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concessions constitutes a tool which can be used to utilize not only existing 
operating infrastructure but also other not operational assets that require capital to be 
invested, the level of capital allocated by the private sector during the contract 
period should be a parameter of the evaluation8. The life cycle of the infrastructure 
is much higher than the length of the concession agreements period9 and as a result 
after the expiration of the concession, the infrastructure and the project in general 
will continue to provide its services either under public or private operation and 
management (ACCA, 2004). In almost every technical project the life cycle exceeds 
50 years while an average concession period is around 30 years. In practice 
concessions horizon is long since short term contracts might influence private party 
to under – invest in the infrastructure as the contract period is limited (Armstrong, 
1994).    
 
The main components of such analysis will be the net present value at termination 
year of the revenues, net of operating costs, that the project will be able to generate 
because of the residual exploitability of fixed assets whose economic life is not yet 
completely exhausted. This should be done in financial analysis at market prices, 
and in economic analysis at shadow prices (Florio, 2004).  
 
The quality both of the infrastructure and the provided services is party depended on 
the level of the capital investment by the concessioner and constitutes significant 
parameter that defines the pricing policy towards the final user / payer of the 
services (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Suppose that the 
private party (or Joint Venture) A is willing to undertake an investment through a 
concession agreement that has an high initial investment cost with high revenues and 
as a result can offer a specific fee to the owner (state) under the concession 
agreement. Alternatively the private party (or Joint Venture) B for the same project 
has a plan that requires lower investment while generating lower revenues and as a 
result the payment to the beneficiary is at the same levels similar with the one 
offered by party A10. Public sector’s interest is to ensure that the selected offer for 
each project provides adequate quality of services and that this factor should be 
 
8 In international research there is a distinction between investments in existing 
infrastructures (Brown field investments) and investments in completely new projects from 
the beginning (green field investments) which bears more risks for the investors and lower 
returns. Refer to Bitsch (2010)   
9 Infrastructures’ design and engineering generally exceed 50 years based at any time on the 
applicable national regulations and local and International technical provisions.     
10 The specific hypothetic scenario might be not fully clear and applied in the case of 
infrastructures related to railway networks or port projects, however is applicable to 
concessions related to marinas, hospitals, as well as to other assets owned by the public 
sector such as logistic parks, areas for integrated tourism developments etc, where the quality 
of services and its effect to the pricing policy is easily anticipated by the end user.   
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included in the analysis when assessing the financial offers submitted by the parties 
during the tender. 
 
5. Including Residual Value in Leasehold Concessions Modeling 
 
The Residual Value is affected and determined by a wide range of factors and 
parameters from the initial design and engineering to the construction and 
maintenance during the operation period. High specifications during the design and 
construction, implementation of high and new reliable technologies, innovation, 
adequate maintenance and investment for upgrading during the operation period 
improve project’s Residual Value and as a result the asset value for the beneficial 
owner (public sector). 
 
In the case of leasehold concession and for the purpose of selecting the preferred and 
higher bidder, the accurate calculation of the Residual Value should not be the major 
aim of the public sector’s authorities. The participation of the Residual Value in the 
models should be at the sense of taking into consideration the added value that it 
provides to the submitted financial offers. Therefore simpler or more complex 
models, than those applied to the cost – benefit analysis, such as depreciation, 
perpetuity and component methods11, can be partly and not fully applicable.  
 
The Residual Value can be described by the following general formula:       
 
Res = f(wuU + wdD + wiI0 + wjIj + wkMk)12
  
Where: 
Res: the Residual Value 
w: represents the weighting factor of each parameter to the Residual Value. 
Ι0” and Ιi the initial investment and the various capital improvements during the 
concession period 
U: the functional value of the asset at the time of its transfer to the public sector, 
which is related to the years of the concession.  
D: the level of the design and engineering and the applied technologies 
Μκ: the level and the quality of maintenance during the contractual period. 
 
For committing to an infrastructure project under a concession contract the Residual 
Value at every time is given by: 
 
Res = I0 e-d(T – t) 13 
 
11 For more details regarding the methods please refer to Jones (2014) 
12 Self process based on approach by Bitsch (2010), South Wales Government (2007) and 
Public Private Partnerships (2007).     
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Where: 
T: the concession period  
d: the depreciation rate until the end of the concession. 
 
Since t < T if the private parties decide to invest at the beginning of the contractual 
period the Residual Value depends on the depreciation d, while, if capital invested at 
the end of the period then the Residual Value equals the capital cost. Proper 
maintenance and regular capital improvements decreases the depreciation rate d 
resulting to a higher Residual Value for the infrastructure.   
 
Generally in models assessing the financial offers of the participants during the 
tender procedure for leasehold concession projects, the contribution of the residual 
value to the results and the selection of the preferred bidder is not taken into 
consideration. These models assess the direct financial benefits for the public sector 
such as lump sum fee, annual fixed remuneration and floating compensation as 
percentage of the revenues or EBIDTA of the SPV. In some projects where there is 
managerial flexibility to perform the investment, tender and contractual documents 
set specific requirements for the concessionaire to fulfill quality and quantity 
obligations related to the asset and / or provided services. This applies for all 
participants. The degree of the flexibility that the manager of the concessioner has to 
decide when and how much will invest is an important parameter. In specific type of 
projects such as water supply the regulator may set specific parameters and 
obligations for the private party to full fill service obligations rather than specific 
investment plan (D’ Alpaos (2006). On the other hand the constant improvement of 
the technology throughout the contractual period might lead into cases where 
qualitative obligations cannot be applicable within a concession contract document. 
 
An objective solution to ensure that the Residual Value is taken into consideration, 
and especially the added value that is being provided by a specific offer compared to 
another, is to include the proposed investment by each participant to the calculation 
of the public sectors benefit in its undepreciated form. This is a feasible technique, 
measurable according to the above analysis which is being applied in the BOT 
projects during the process of achieving value for money14 but not to leasehold 
concession so far. 
 
 
13 D’ Alpaos (2006) uses the Residual Value in order to calculate the concession length by 
applying a simplified model of Brownian process by Mc Donald (1986)  
14 This is being proposed in Ireland BOT guide and constitutes non cash flow adjustments. 
Refer to Public Private Partnerships (2007) 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 The Residual Value component in the leasehold concession contracts constitutes a 
risk factor that should be taken into consideration even at the early stage of projects 
design and in any case at the preferred bidder selection stage. Although the 
investment flexibility of the concessionaire should not be affected, the 
diversification of each financial offer and its contribution to the overall project’s 
value and to the benefits for the public sector should be taken into consideration and 
assessed accordingly. 
 
Project will be able to generate further income by providing services as the 
economic life is not yet completely exhausted at the concession completion.The 
techniques related to the depreciated investment at the end of the contractual period 
together with any interim investment plan adapted to the characteristics of the 
project can be applied, similar to the BOT projects when undertaking the value for 
money achievement process or the financial procedures during the cost benefit 
analysis process.    
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